CIR NO.688/04/2003-CX, DT. 03/01/2003

CIR NO.688/04/2003-CX, DT. 03/01/2003

Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of CCE, Bombay vs M/s Maharashtra Fur Fabric Ltd reported in 2002(145)ELT 287(SC).

Kind attention is invited to the above mentioned judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. In this case, M/s Maharashtra Fur Fabric Ltd were manufacturing high fur fabrics by silver knitting process. In classification list filed by the party, the product were classified under Heading 60.01 and the benefit of the Notification No.109/1986-CE, dated 27.2.86 as amended by Notification No. 3/1988-CE, dated 19.1.88 was claimed attracting nil rate of duty. The party was entitled to the exemption under the above Notification till 19th January, 1988 when the proviso was inserted therein. As per the provisio exemption shall not be available to knitted or crocheted fabrics of manmade textile material falling under sub-heading No.6001.12 and subjected to the process of bleaching, dyeing, printing, shrink proofing, tentering, heat-setting, crease-resistant processing or any other process or any two or more of these processes. The Hon’ble Court has inter-alia held as under:

“A careful reading of the proviso to the notification would show that by resorting not only to the process of bleaching, dyeing, printing, shrink proofing, tentering, heat-setting, crease-resistant processing, but also to “any other process or any two or more of these processes”, the respondent would lose the benefit of the exemption. It is a well established principle that general terms following particular expressions take their colour and meaning as that of the preceding expressions, applying the principle of ejusdem generis rule, therefore, in construing the words ‘any other process’, the import of the specific expressions will have to be kept in mind. It follows that the words ‘or any other process’ would have to be understood in the same sense in which the process, including tentering, would be understood. Thus understood, a process akin to stentering/tentering would fall within the meaning of the proviso and, consequently, the benefit of the notification cannot be availed by the respondent”.

“ In this view of the matter, the proviso clearly applies and the respondent, therefore, is not entitled to the benefit of the notification. The order under appeal is set aside …………”.

The above judgment is in favour of the Revenue. I am therefore, directed to request you to circulate this judgment to all the field formations under your charge for their information.

Sd/-
(Mahender Pal)
Under Secretary (JC)

F. No. 385/494/94-JC